In this century, the first project to promote democracy by means of intervention was conducted in Iraq, in March 2003. The United States, as the leader of democratic countries, tried to bring about regime change and transform the country into a democracy. More than a decade ago, Iraq’s autocratic regime was overthrown and the country was plunged into a civil war led by militant groups. Throughout that time, there has been no clear idea of how to successfully promote democracy. In this work, we are going to analyse why Iraq’s first decade since the regime change has been a failure, and why the country has gradually begun, step-by-step, to accept democracy and democratic culture and values. We discovered that today’s Iraqi citizens are willing to join the democratic umbrella and accept and share the values connected with it; in this regard, it is important to seek out democratic models and their elements which can give us insight into the psychology behind the decision that has been made.
The author Michael McFaul, in his work “Democracy Promotion as a World Value”, argues that after the September 11th terrorist attacks in the USA, President George W. Bush began to entertain the proposal of promoting democracy abroad, in countries where he stressed the moral and strategic imperatives of advancing freedom around the world. During his presidency, the United States suffered in its international standing both in democratic and non-democratic states, mainly because of his administration’s decision to invade Iraq.1
During the Bush era, the administration’s own view of democracy promotion in different states was pursued. The author stresses that the US, without having the right to tends the monopolise democracy promotion – but in today’s multi-polar world, Washington, DC must seek to secure these goals in the international arena.
In our work, we concur with McFaul’s view that the bipolar system had broadly worked, but that this era was brought to an end by the failure in Iraq. Nowadays, there are new superpowers who is going to be participating more and more actively in the international arena. We stress that we do agree that the US needs to be successful in its goal of securing democracy promotion. McFaul’s works are very well written and chronologically ordered, allowing readers to follow his simple but erudite introduction to the topic of democracy promotion; we are thus going to use it in our own explanations and to underline our means, implementation and evaluation.
The work of Frederic S. Pearson, Scott Walker, and Stephanie Stern, entitled “Military Intervention and Prospects for Democratisation”, we will look to mainly for historical facts. Their work presents a study of the research on democracy promotion and its impacts in the states where the US has deployed it. They discovered – and their main argument is – that democracy promotion needs to be accompanied by free and fair elections during the “intervention” stage. Thus, if there are military actions being carried out in the name of democracy promotion, they must be precipitately followed by the establishment of the full array of democratic organs, in pursuit of a particular strategy to ensure a positive and viable outcome.2
Unfortunately, the work of these authors is based on only one research study, so the levels of bias and inaccuracy in it are higher than the norm. Nevertheless, it still provides us with some very important knowledge for our research purposes. We will argue that during the process of democracy promotion, more than free and fair elections is required because democracy is a complex of elements. Through our indexes, we will address an inaccurate statement which has been advanced in their work.
Thomas Carothers, in US Democracy Promotion: During and After Bush, argues that the presidency of George W. Bush and his administration’s intervention in Iraq was based on a semi-realist approach. Furthermore, it was involved in significant clashes on the issue of the promotion of democracy with states including China, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Russia and many others3. The author takes a negative view of American democracy promotion, and he conceives of democracy promotion in terms of two processes. Firstly, ‘Decontamination’, which closely associates democracy promotion with military intervention followed by regime change 4, and applying heavy pressure to key autocratic partners like Pakistan and Egypt. Secondly, there is ‘Repositioning’, which denotes the rhetorical activity of presenting democracy promotion as the centrepiece of the war on terrorism and advancing a commitment to supporting the democratic change in the future, in order to diminish the formation of radicalisation. We will argue, according to our view of democracy promotion, that it always has to take place on the basis of a partnership for development in order to be successful, and we will illustrate this with the example of Iraq. The author’s final element is Discontinuity, in which US foreign policy and its pursuit of democracy promotion are adapted according to which threats are newly emerging in the international arena.
Nelli Babayan and Daniela Huber, in Motioned, Debated Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in International Affairs, have developed very smart and efficient categories and tools for measuring levels of democracy promotion, which we will implement in creating our own democratic promotion models. They follow the same line as the authors above, that nowadays we are heading into a multi-polar international arena. However, their main argument is that, in today’s world, which saw the US financial crisis spill over onto Europe and other parts of the world, it is not possible to have democracy and democracy promotion in its own bubble, free from the influence of external factors.5 In the case of Iraq, they claim that this intervention undercut the values of democracy promotion as a whole. Furthermore, democracy promotion and the Western liberal agenda has become strongly associated with occupation, corruption, war and torture in the Arab world. In our work, we will concentrate on the Iraqi example, and try to answer why democracy and its promotion has been tarnished in the Arab world, so that this model can become easily applicable to different regions, because, as we can see in this work, democracy subsists in the whole interconnected complex of systems which is the world. Important actors include state institutions, political society, civil society and individual citizens. In our work, we will bring this particular table to bear on the example of Iraq.
In democracy promotion, many actors have aggressively intervened with third parties in seeking to promote and enforce human rights norms, rather than promoting the democratic system as a model to adopt. Moreover, over years in which support for democracy has grown, the promotion of democracy by several NGOs has had a significant effect. States have invited foreign observers to their elections or to monitor basic human rights – this would have been inconceivable just a few decades ago. In this light, reforms and promotion of the benefits of participating in multilateral institutions have presented us with novel and effective tools with which to increase and promote democracy.6
U.S. presidents have identified democracy promotion as a vital strategic interest of the United States. The growth of the democracy promotion ensured a central position for Washington, D.C. in the international arena, but they have sometimes been seen to sacrifice it in pursuit of economic or security interests. We may note they have used democracy promotion in selective areas, as in Franklin Roosevelt’s pursuing it in France rather than in Poland; or when Ronald Reagan forcefully promoted forcefully democracy in countries under Communist rule rather than in Africa; or when Bush concentrated his promotion of democracy on Iraq, rather than Pakistan or Russia.7
Democracy promotion has mostly grown out of the rise of US hegemony. Nowadays, there are other significant actors in it, such as the European Union, or the rising Middle Eastern powers, which are either favouring or denouncing the US foreign policy, but are nevertheless in favour of elective elections and agree on the need for further democratisation in their region.8 Furthermore, many democratic movements in autocratic states who are fighting for a better future are weakening autocratic regimes step-by-step.9
Promotion of democracy is different in each particular state. As such, a particular strategy needs to be developed in order to deploy a viable promotion of democracy in the state in question.10 “Democracy and peace is more of a historic promise, which is realised through global movements and institutions, than a settled pattern which can be identified with established democratic nation-states and their inter-relations.”11 Moreover, imposed democracy promotion is built on liberal theory in international politics and has most often been used in the conduct of US foreign policy.12
During the Reagan presidency, the administration promoted democracy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; the ‘umbrella’ of democracy also encompassed massive arms buildup, subsequent to strong criticisms levelled at the Soviet Union. Moreover, Reagan also pursued partnerships with autocratic governments which were useful for the foreign policy of the US, as with Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, …13 Another example of democracy promotion can be observed in the presidency of Bill Clinton, where he tried to utilise a policy of “commitment to democracy’s fortunes abroad”. During the post-Cold War era, when the US position as the hegemony was established, Clinton started expanded democracy to Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Russia and other parts of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.14
US foreign policy and its promotion of democracy change according to perceived threats from different states, rather than in response to a regime’s non-democratic character. The US more concerned about whether newly elected governments will be friendlier towards it, or not.15 After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, President George W. Bush stressed the moral and strategic imperatives for freedom around the world. However, after the invasion of Iraq, the image of the United States was tarnished both in democratic and in non-democratic states.16
Threats to democracy are many, as many states have undergone liberalisation without democracy promotion, while some new democracies have performed badly. Moreover, the war in Iraq has for the first time endangered democratic institutions and states which had been promoting democratic values.17 The emerging multi-polar system has not been adapted to by all means. After more than a decade of war in the Middle East, it is time for the US to rethink their ideas of democracy promotion.18
We have already identified the theoretical powers which can provide us with the means to establish the hypothesis. We will find out how we can measure democracy promotion and democratisation in particular states in the Middle East. Through our theoretical exercises, we found that democratisation has been pursued since World War II and that it is important to gather the primary indexes according to which we can measure it. Following on from this, we need to discover how we these indexes can make our analysis more precise. Our hypothesis is that war in Iraq has encouraged its citizens to accept democracy after a decade of US involvement in the region. Iraqis are willing to come together under the democratic umbrella, and accept and share the values connected with it. In our hypothesis, we are going to confirm our [3 (2+1) + 3] models of democracy promotion and its sectors and elements for further specification.
IV. Measures and evidence
The four models of social external democratisation are coercion, conditionality, persuasion and socialisation.
Coercion: this model presents the idea that democracy imposes its approaches and values in states where democracy does not exist. In the particular state which is undergoing change by democratisation, there is an insufficient force to provide the necessary changes or guarantee the right conditions for the promotion of democracy. There are states or organisations which are going to impose democracy elsewhere. Coercion happens when actors of autocratic states do not want to share or power or allow their states to become democratic. We can find examples of democratisation by coercion in the post-World War II period when Japan and West Germany submitted to the Western powers under coercive democratisation. Furthermore, NATO enlargement in Central Europe dealt with the transition to democracy. Nowadays, coercive democracy has changed according to the shifting international environment, while military cooperation/security assistance has come to encompass democracy promotion. Democratisation by coercion has been moved to the centre of scholarly interest by George W. Bush, whose presidency saw the US-led “coalition of the willing” invading Iraq. With coercive democratisation, it is clear that intervention should be enacted via, and approved by, international organisations (the OSCE, the UN), which provide legitimacy to the actions and help to safeguard the new order. Moreover, state sovereignty must still be guaranteed and needs to be counterbalanced against the universal validity of human rights. Conditionality: this model is based on promises and non-violent threats between two states: as sender and recipient. The greatest example of it is the European Union, with its conditions for the further members and institutional structure. We can observe that democracy promotion by conditionality has been seen as the most successful mechanism. Persuasion: this model is based on the premise that the values of individuals are influenced by arguments and reasoning. This means that societal deliberation leads to legitimate political decisions. In this manner, communicative international actions play a role on the societal and the elite level, and they are ripe for social learning through internalising norms and ideas in a way which is changing the platform of politics. Communicative action happens when elites and international organisations are engaged in political dialogue and deliberative bargaining. Persuasion is one of the key models of democracy promotion. Firstly, actors need to act through mutual trust and Concord – and secondly, at the collective level. Finally, actors from the international arena need to take into account the following factors: access to domestic actors which can shape the regime change, differences between international civil society and state actors with a lack of vested state interests, and a stressed role of actors within the society in which the democratic norms and values are to take root.19 Socialisation: is a model in opposition to persuasion, and tends towards normative rationality; the exchanging of social norms and values are placed at the centre of interest. Thus, effective socialisation appears as a model of social learning in which ideas and values have been formed by communicative conviction or by an experience of practical appropriateness.20 Democratisation by Socialisation – from unstructured social action to external governance – is presented in two meanings, as a logic of consequentialism (conditionality), and the logic of appropriateness (socialisation). This is why we need to distinguish, and separate, the processing of incentives and social learning. In this model, direct persuasion operates through symbolic values. If a particular state wants to be democratised, then society must be open to it, following along with their leaders to open up external norms.21
V. Application toward Iraq
V. I. Situation in Iraq
After five years of US military presence in Iraq, the country’s newly trained Iraqi armed forces launched their first attacks against militants in 2008. After the US withdrawal of its troops in 2011, there has been increased political instability, especially after the Arab Spring protests which spread to Iraq in February 2011. In the years 2012 and 2013, and the following Syrian Civil War, Iraq has been a centre of the instability of two dominant and significant different religious groupings: Shiite and Sunni Muslims. There has been a struggle for power. In the wake of the intervention, the Shiite faction began to dominate the government and started to create a front line against Sunnis. In 2014, Sunni militant groups targeted Iraq’s Shia population to undermine the political situation that had prevailed up to that point.22’23 This occurred against the backdrop of the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant by Islamist radical groups which is also comprised of Sunnis, and proclaimed its ‘Caliphate’ in 2014. In this climate, there have been talks of partitioning Iraq into three autonomous regions: Sunni-stan, Shia-stan in the southeast and Kurdistan in the northeast – these proposals have been advanced by the current, 48th Prime minister of Iraq Haider al-Abadi, and have been greeted by Washington as “another major step forward” in bringing stability to Iraq.24
V. II. Iraq & data
In appendix I. and I. I., we can see that the majority of non-democratic states are in the Middle East, in which Iraq is located. According to appendix II., it is clear that a strong majority of Iraqis say reconciliation is important; in appendix III., we can see that Iraqis agree on four areas of potential collaboration which can be used to push the reconciliation process forward. It is very important to take note of the key reforms, which are: adopting an achievable plan to fight corruption effectively, ensuring a fair judicial process, strengthening the economy and ending sectarian quotas for government positions and jobs. At the same time, in the following appendix IV, our survey from December 2015 – January 2016 finds that Iraqis believe that the country is going in the wrong direction. From appendix V., we find out that a majority of Shia Muslims believe that Iraq is a unified country, whereas a majority of Kurds and Sunnis believe the opposite. This can be simply explained by the fact that the Shia government is in power, while Sunnis have allegiance to DAESH, and Kurds are trying to create their own sovereign country in the land of Iraq. However, in the following appendix VI., we see that a strong majority of Iraqis say that reconciliation is important. At the same time, also in Appendix VI., it is seen to be important that Iraqis agree on four areas of potential collaboration which can be used to push the reconciliation process forward (the four key reforms mentioned above, but more precisely calibrated: adoption of an achievable plan to fight corruption effectively, ensuring a fair judicial process, strengthening the economy and ending sectarian quotas for government positions and jobs).
In appendix VIII. we can see that the peak of civilian deaths in Iraq was reached in 2006 when there were about 34, 452 thousand fatalities; in 2010, there were 2, 953, but by 2013 the total had risen back to 7, 818. Why have the deaths been increasing? In the following appendix IX., we can see that while in 2003 there were around 19, 500 U.S. troops stationed in the country, this increased in 2006 to around 26, 000 because of the growing violence; finally, in 2011-2012, when the US withdrew its troops, there were around 100, 000 troops. These two appendices lead us onto X., where the increasing deaths in Iraq and increasing military presence is owing to the conflict between the two main political groups: ISF (Iraqi Security Forces) and DAESH. In June 2014, ISIL seizes all of Nine and Anbar, located in Tikrit; in response to this, the US sent additional troops (at that time in appendix IX., we can see that there were around 10, 000). Nowadays, there have been renewed hostilities between ISIL and ISF + militias in Ramadi. At the height of Iraq’s bloody decade, the greatest number of coalition and civilian deaths was reached in the years 2005-2008 (in which time there was the lowest amount of US deployed troops). In addition, the biggest causes of death were executions, small arms gunfire and bombs (suicide, roadside and vehicle bombs). Finally, in our last paragraph, we can see that inside Iraq, there is a very chaotic situation and there are more than two states which are playing a significant role in the domestic order: Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqi government, DAESH, the US, and Iran.
V. III. Iraq under democratic umbrella
The US intervention in Iraq was clearly an example of democracy promotion by coercion, in which a state imposed democracy on Iraq. We discovered that during the war against terrorism, the US has imposed conditions on Iraq and set up particular goals and priorities in which the country has to cooperate, in order for the removal of US troops from their soil to happen. In persuasion terms, we can see that the main roles are being played by the Presidents and Prime Ministers in the US and Iraqi systems. Through our appendices, we see that the key role for the domestic settlement is the Prime Minister of Iraq and that this only happens communicative action in which the PM is actively participating – as in our example of alliance and involvement in the international organisation to fight against terrorism on a large scale. This kind of action is essential to the interests of the external actor in democratisation by coercion when a state acts alone (or states act together in an alliance, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). However, in this approach, the successful promotion of democracy is not strongly guaranteed. The most important model for Iraq is democratisation by socialisation, in which leaders (as was mentioned above in the persuasion model) play key roles in the state and also shape policy and direct its progress. In the socialisation model, the Prime Minister learns norms and ideas which can then be used in the domestic policy of Iraq: changing the platform of politics. That is why it is so important to actively integrate these three models together.
From appendixes II.-VI., it is clear that after a decade of trying to adapt the mentality to understanding westernisation and developing its particular methods, Iraqis have absorbed the priority of democracy promotion and want to be reconciled with each other. As such, it is vital at present to pursue democratisation by socialisation for a democratic leader who needs to share the values and norms provided by the Western example. Moreover, in a simple way, the main key reforms are the same for each of democracy model as regards achieving the plan to fight corruption more effectively, have a fair judicial process, strengthen the economy and abolish quotas for government positions. This provides us with clear confirmation of our context and indexes in democracy – from a political and economic point of view. We have to admit that Western states have begun to implement democratic values in a region where they had never before pertained (this is why the adjustment process has taken so long, and why a Western state presence has had to be deployed for a long time). We discovered that Iraqis believe that the country is going in the wrong direction, and the most important point to note is that the majority of Iraq (Shia) believe in reconciliation by key reforms, in strengthening the economy and ensuring a fair judicial process. We also found out that democracy by coercion is possible, but it has to be carried out in an efficient way. The most stable situation was in 2009-2012 when there were 44 000 – 100 000 U.S. troops stationed in the country, helping to secure its peaceful evolution both politically and culturally. By all means, we can conclude from Table I. – Sectors and Levels of Democracy Promotion that it is clear that after a decade, Iraq accepted its willingness to become a democratic state at the level of its citizens, and has set up its particular goals and methods of democracy promotion as follows: state institutions, where they will have an independent judiciary and other law-oriented institutions (democratic promotion: coercion; needs assistance of the US); rule-of-law aid; a representative legislature and a responsive local government with free and fair elections supported by a pro-democratic military; political social organs such as strong national political parties, and the fact that by now, the majority of its citizens believe in reconciliation (democratic promotion in the forms of political party building and local government development: socialisation plus conditionality, set up by Westernising superpowers such as the European Union and the US); a civil society in which NGOs will be active in advocacy (democracy promotion in the form of NGO building: persuasion), plus development of its culture and symbols of individual citizens – a political educated citizenry
By these means, we developed four functional models of democracy and inserted them into their elements from the sectors and levels of democracy promotion. We strengthened our theoretical power and stabilised the degree of accuracy in how to measure democracy promotion in states which had been under it for more than a year.
Type of action by democratic promoters
democracy promotion recipients
Submissive -> Obedience, Evasion, Apathy
|Conditionality + Social interaction|
Compliance -> Reward / Punishment relationship -> Effective -> Government Development
Internalisation of ideas / Identity change of norms and values are accepted -> Political educated citizenry
|Political educated citizenry|
Table I. – Sectors and Levels of Democracy Promotion25
Appendix I. – Democracy in Asia
Appendix I. I. – Level of Democracy
Appendix II. – A strong majority of Iraqis say reconciliation is important26
Appendix III. – Iraqis key reforms27
Appendix IV. – Iraqis believe that the country is going in the wrong direction28
Appendix V. – Shia / Sunnis believing in Iraq in different ways29
Appendix VI. – Key reforms vol. II.30
Appendix VII. – Civilian deaths in Iraq 2008-2013
Appendix VIII. – Afghanistan drawdown
Appendix IX. – Key events and internal displacement in Iraq
Appendix XI. – situation in domestic policy in Iraq
Appendix X. – Iraq’s bloody toll
I. Michael McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004-5, 147-164.
II. Frederic S. Pearson, Scott Walker, and Stephanie Stern, Military Intervention and Prospects for Democratisation, International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2006, 63-86
III. Fatih Balci, Do democracies promote peace in the lights of democratic peace theory?, International Journal of Human Sciences, Volume 8 Issue 1 2011, 729-739.
IV. Timm Beichelt, The Research Field of Democracy Promotion, Living Reviews in Democracy, July 2012, Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich, available at http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2012-1,
V. Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion: During and After Bush (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, 2007), 1-34.
VI. Susan B. Epstein, Nina M. Serafino, and Francis T. Miko, Specialists in Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?, CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report for Congress: December 26, 2007, Washington DC, 1-36.
VII. Dukhong Kim, Democracy Promotion and American’s Support for Troop Use, Florida Atlantic University, Trames, 2014, 135-138.
VIII. Milja Kurki, Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion, International Studies Review, September 2010, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228007599, 54.
IX. Carothers, Thomas, and Richard Youngs. “Democracy Is Not Dying.” Foreign Affairs. April 12, 2017. Accessed April 12, 2017 (downloaded April 13, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-04-11/democracy-not-dying)
X. Feuer, Sarah J. “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy.” Foreign Affairs. April 12, 2017. Accessed April 12, 2017 (downloaded April 13, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/2016-06-08/political-islam-muslim-democracy)
XI. Lowenthal, Abraham F., and Sergio Bitar. “Getting to Democracy.” Foreign Affairs. April 12, 2017. Accessed April 12, 2017. (downloaded April 13, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-14/getting-democracy)
1 Michael McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004-5, 147.
2 Frederic S. Pearson, Scott Walker, and Stephanie Stern, Military Intervention and Prospects for Democratisation, International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2006, 64.
3 Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion: During and After Bush (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, 2007), 1-5.
4 *democratic promotion
5 Nelli Babayan and Daniela Huber, Motioned, Debated Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in International Affairs, TRANSWORLD: The Transatlantic Relationship and The Future Global Governance, Working Paper 06, December 2012, 10.
6 Michael McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004-5, 156.
7 Michael McFaul, Democracy Promotion …, 158.
8 Ibid., 159.
9 Michael McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004-5, 159-161.
10 Frederic S. Pearson, Scott Walker, and Stephanie Stern, Military Intervention and Prospects for Democratisation, International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2006, 64.
11 Fatih Balci, Do democracies promote peace in the lights of democratic peace theory?, International Journal of Human Sciences, Volume 8 Issue 1 2011, 738.
12 Frederic S. Pearson, Scott Walker, and Stephanie Stern, Military Intervention …, 63.
13 Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion: During and After Bush (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, 2007), 16.
14 Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion: During …, 15-17.
15 Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion: During and After Bush (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, 2007), 15-17.
16 Michael McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004-5, 147.
17 Nelli Babayan and Daniela Huber, Motioned, Debated Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in International Affairs, TRANSWORLD: The Transatlantic Relationship and The Future Global Governance, Working Paper 06, December 2012, 9.
18 Nelli Babayan and Daniela Huber, Motioned, Debated Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy …, 10.
19 Timm Beichelt, The Research Field of Democracy Promotion, Living Reviews in Democracy, July 2012, Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich, available at http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2012-1, 5-6.
20 Timm Beichelt, The Research Field of Democracy …, 3-4.
21 Ibid, 6.
22 BBC, Middle East, Iraq Sunni protests in Anbar against Nouri al-Maliki (downloaded on April 15 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20860647)
23 Feuer, Sarah J. “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy.” Foreign Affairs. April 12, 2017. Accessed April 12, 2017 (downloaded April 13, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/2016-06-08/political-islam-muslim-democracy)
24 Devika That and Tony Bonnici, White House hails al Maliki departure as ‘major step forward’, The Times, (downloaded on April 15 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/white-house-hails-al-maliki-departure-as-major-step-forward-09pxm0gck5s)
25 Nelli Babayan and Daniela Huber, Motioned, Debated Agreed? Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in International Affairs, TRANSWORLD: The Transatlantic Relationship and The Future Global Governance, Working Paper 06, December 2012, 1-16.
26 NDI, Public Opinion Research Points to Path orward for Iraq reconciliation (downloaded on April 15, https://www.ndi.org/Poll_Points_Path_Forward_Iraq_Reconciliation)
27 NDI, Public Opinion Research Points to Path orward for Iraq reconciliation (downloaded on April 15, https://www.ndi.org/Poll_Points_Path_Forward_Iraq_Reconciliation)
28 NDI, Public Opinion Research Points to …
29 NDI, Public Opinion Research Points to Path orward for Iraq reconciliation (downloaded on April 15, https://www.ndi.org/Poll_Points_Path_Forward_Iraq_Reconciliation)
30 NDI, Public Opinion Research Points to …